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I
INTRODUCTION
River basin development generally calls to mind the Tennessee Valley, the Missouri
Valley, the Colorado Valley-large areas, covering several states or parts of states.
Attention focuses on the basin and on the role that rivers, once thought of as bar-
riers, have come to play as nationally or regionally unifying forces. The over-all
problems seem, at first blush, primarily to be federal ones that transcend purely state
or local interest. But the fact is that rivers form and cross the boundaries of several
states, and these states, thus, have exerted and will continue to exert a great influence
on their development. Moreover, no matter how unified a "river basin plan" may
appear to be as a whole, it is composed ofmany separate subbasins and projects which
may be totally contained within a single state and which must be internally co-
ordinated as well as externally related to the major basin plan.
River basin development, accordingly, is seen to be not an exclusively federal
function consisting entirely of the large works constructed by the federal government
on the major rivers. The states, their lesser governmental units, and private agencies,
too, play an important role. Thus, some states even engage in the actual construction
of projects, through such agencies as the Montana Water Conservation Board' and the
state-created "authorities" that have developed the Texas coastal rivers.2 Irrigation,
conservancy, public-power, flood-control, and drainage districts also construct works
that individually and in the aggregate make significant contributions to full river
basin development And much activity is directed by private interests, ranging from
the large coordinated projects of the major power companies, cooperative water
companies, and major industrial users to the individual efforts of a single farmer who
controls the water on his fields. For the most part, these public and private agencies
operate under state law, and these institutional laws, consequently, have an im-
portant effect upon river basin development. But the state laws that have even
greater influence are those dealing with the private water rights of individuals.
Some features of river basin development may, of course, depend wholly upon
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eral Counsel, Missouri Basin Survey Commission, 1952. Author, CASES ON WESTERN WATER LAw (1954),
and articles in legal periodicals on water law and related subjects.
' See MissouRI BASIN SURVEY CoMm'N, MIssoURI: LAND AND WATER 82-83, 255 (r953).
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federal law, where, for example, navigation, flood control, and federal power are
involved, and state-created rights of water allocation must give way And the recently
declared redervation of water rights for federally-owned lands that are not "public
lands"5 has raised other possibilities that the federal government may engage in de-
velopment in the western states without regard to state laws.0 Yet, absent such an
overriding federal interest, the component parts of even a federal river basin develop-
ment plan will be profoundly influenced by state water law. For, any agency planning
a project for the control and use of water must do so with reference to certain putative
beneficiaries; and the allocation of the water rights, the eligibility for these rights, and
the exercise of these rights will, in most cases, be governed by the law of the state
in which the water is controlled and used. Under some state laws, a federal or re-
gional project may be difficult to plan, its costs may be increased, or its benefits may
be restricted or reduced in value. Indeed, the very existence of the project may de-
pend upon state water law.7
What kind of state water law, then, would best implement river basin develop-
ment? Possibly germane considerations may be, of course, whether the law is to be
for Arizona or Vermont, for the basin of the Missouri River or of Horseshoe Creek,
for the industralized Connecticut Valley or the untamed reaches of the upper
Colorado. Nevertheless, it is believed that some criteria can be defined that will have
universal validity, the basic assumption being that all water allocation problems have
one feature in common-there is not enough water for all possible uses, and some
choice must be made among competing users or would-be users.
At the outset, the basic position propounded in this article should be stated: that
prior appropriation, in the balance, seems to be the best extant system of law for river
basin development in the United States. Let it be hastily added, however, that "prior
appropriation" does not mean the uncontrolled exploitation of water resources by the
first taker, nor the law of any particular western state, nor the expropriation of all
riparian rights, nor any particular form of substitution of priorities for riparianism.
Nor is prior appropriation the name for a homogeneous body of uniform law, for it
'United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (x940); Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkin-
son Co., 313 U.S. 508 (94i); United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
'FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (the United States can, without regard to state law, dispose
of water rights in a nonnavigable stream that are applicable to both lands within Indian reservations and
lands withdrawn from entry and reserved for power purposes). The Desert Land Act, 19 STAT. 377
(1877), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§321 et seq. (952), had been held to reserve all nonnavigable sources
of water "on the public lands" for the use of the public under state law. California Oregon Power
Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (935). See Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S. 863, 84th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (956).
'Treaties with foreign nations and the Indian tribes may create other opportunities for federal de-
velopment independent of state law. See Note, 17 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 251 (1945); United States v.
Ahtanum Irri. Dist., 236 F.,d 321 (9th Cir. 1956).
The Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of the Reclamation Act of x9o2, must
proceed in conformity with state laws relating to the control, appropriation, use, and distribution of water.
32 STAT. 390, 43 U.S.C. §383 (1952). In all but two of the seventeen western states to which the act
is applicable, this involves the procuring, by the Secretary, of a permit from the state water officials. See
Rank v. (Krug) United States, 142 F. Supp. 1, 124 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
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exhibits wide variations in the laws of the western states. Moreover, some of its mani-
festations are good; some are bad-at least some seem less well designed than others to
accomplish the maximum and optimum development of water resources; and some
are obviously not suitable for transplantation to the East. But within this large body
of law are rules, techniques, and devices with which to meet every criticism leveled at
the generalized concept of "prior appropriation," whether the criticism is directed at
existing doctrine in the West or at the doctrine as a solution for eastern problems
raised by riparian law. In other words, western appropriation could be improved in
many ways, and the best of this law could be used as a model by any state to meet its
local needs. The West has had a century of experience with water shortages; the
East is just beginning to fear them. The doctrine of prior appropriation has shown
that it contains elements of remarkable flexibility and an ability to grow. It has made
the transition from a pioneer system of acquiring water rights to a modern system of
state control of water resources Practically every suggestion yet made for the im-
provement of eastern water law has been based upon ideas, techniques, or practices
now current in the West.9
II
MAXIMUM DEVELOPMENT
The first prerequisite of a model state system of water law is that it should en-
courage, or at least not deter, maximum development. The most severe criticism of
riparian law has been leveled at its shortcomings on this score, particularly with
regard to its limitations on the place of use of water. Since the ownership of adjacent
land is the basis of the riparian right, a stream's waters are reserved for the use of
owners of tracts located on its banks, and usually for use on such land ° A further
limitation is that regardless of the extent of the riparian ownership, the use must be
within the watershed of the stream." Of course, use by nonriparians or by riparians
beyond the watershed is not proscribed completely, but it exists in spite of rather
than because of riparian laws-either because the riparian has no use for the water,
12
' Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by the State, i ROCKY MT. L.
REv. 161 (1928).
'See Ellis, Some Current and Proposed Water-Rights Legislation in the Eastern States, 41 IowA L.
REv. 237 (1956); Marquis, Freeman, and Heath, The Movement for New Water Rights Laws in the
Tennessee Valley States, 23 TENN. L. REV. 797 (1955); Coates, Present and Proposed Legal Control
of Water Resources in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 256; Barlowe, Proposed Water Rights Legislation
in Michigan, 26 LAm EcoN. 300 (1950). Most of these papers contain cautious reservations and sug-
gestions for further study. Haar and Gordon, Legislative Change of Water Law in Massachusetts: A Case
Study of the Consequences of Introducing a Prior Appropriation System, in SyMpOsIuM ON THE LAw
oF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATEs (to be published by The Conservation Founda-
tion I957), is a spirited defense of riparianism; yet, it suggests an eastern state might profit from securing
some of the benefits of a water administrative agency, injecting into determinations of reasonable use
factors of priority, protection of investment, and social utility, and perhaps discarding the watershed limita-
tion on use of water.
"o Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 2x6 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (I913).
'x Ibid.
m Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co., 86 Ala. 587, 6 So. 78 (1889).
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because there is no shortage,"3 because the riparian has been bought out,14 or because
prescriptive rights have intervened to protect the user.' 5 As for the extent of the
use that can be made by the riparian, however, the old "natural flow" rule, which
permitted lower riparians to enjoin uses resulting in substantial diminutions of the
stream, is today regarded principally as a bugaboo found in old opinions or in am-
biguous dicta. ' The inutility of this doctrine is so offensive to the modern mind,
in the light of the modern emphasis on maximum development, that it is not thought
to present any serious obstacle. The modern rule, certainly the modern trend, is to
permit all reasonable uses, regardless of the amount of water consumed, with reason-
ableness being measured either by the lack of damage to others or by the relative in-
significance of the damage compared to the value of the use.'7 As long, then, as the
development is on riparian land, riparian law is no deterrent.
In contrast, the appropriative doctrine generally encourages development any-
where. The basic tenet of the doctrine is that beneficial use is the basis of the right.
Wherever there is need for water, whoever needs it, can be applied to serve the
demand. The case that first applied the rule of appropriation to a dispute between
the gold miners on the western public domain' 8 and the case that first propounded
the "Colorado Doctrine" of basing all state water rights on prior appropriation'0 both
approved diversions from one stream across the divide for use in the watershed of
another, and the rule permitting this practice has been regarded as almost universal.20
Yet, there are backwaters in the stream of prior appropriation; in some western
states, restrictions on the place of use of appropriated water have been imposed.
Colorado has prohibited conservancy districts planning the exportation of water from
the Colorado River to the eastern slope of the continental divide from impairing or
increasing in cost any present or prospective appropriation for use within the basin
of the river.2' California, in setting up a state agency to construct the Central Valley
Project, provided that a watershed or adjacent area which can be conveniently sup-
plied with its water shall not be deprived of the prior right to all the water required
to supply the beneficial needs of the watershed or area 2 Another California law
permits a state agency to file applications for priorities that are, in effect, reservations
of water for a long-range state water plan, but use under this plan may not deprive
the county in which the water originated of any water necessary for the develop-
ment of the county 3 These "watershed of origin" and "county of origin" statutes
" Elliot v. The Fitchburg Railroad Co., 64 Mass. (io Cush.) z9z (1852).
14 Texas Co. v. Burkett, 17 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273 (1927).
"
3 Martin v. Burr, ir Tex. 57, 228 S.W. 543 (1921).
116See Marquis, Freeman and Heath, supra note 9.
" See REsrATEMENT, ToRT § §852-54 (1939). "Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. k40 (1855).
19 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
" Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). The most notable exception is in Nebraska. See
Osterman v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irri. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (X936). And an
ambiguous Texas statute leaves the rule in that state in doubt. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. art. 7590 (1948).
"1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §149-6-13 (1953).
"CAL. WATER CODE ANN. §§1146o, T1463 (West r956).
23 Id., §1oo 5 .
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have been held applicable to the federal projects which have supplanted the earlier
state enterprises.2 4 To the extent that these are thoughtful exceptions, preserving
waters from immediate use in order to reserve them for a better future use, they may
be wise laws. But to the extent that they reflect local pressures for preferred treat-
ment, making blanket reservations of water for the uncertain future uses of the
residents of the basin, they may foreclose valuable and needed projects which would
otherwise be feasible under modern engineering methods.
Another type of political restriction on place of use, which may have a special
impact on river basin programs, involves interstate appropriations. In many early
appropriations on interstate streams, the water was diverted in one state, transported
across the state line, and used in another. Such rights were universally upheld;25
but many states, in an excess of localism, have adopted statutes that restrict this
practice. The most extreme law is that of Colorado, which, for the expressed pur-
pose of preserving all of the water within the state for the use of the state and its
citizens, absolutely prohibits the transportation of water found in Colorado into any
other state2 More typical statutes permit appropriations for out-of-state use if the
state in which the use is to be made grants reciprocal privileges or if the legislature
gives specific approval to each such diversion?7  Statutes such as Colorado's are
obviously undesirable from the standpoint of river basin development, and even the
more liberal statutes seems out of place today. Developments in one state, where
the slope of the land dictates a diversion point in another, should not depend upon
the grace of unilateral action by the state in which the diversion is made. More
properly, the problem is one of allocating water between states, a problem better
settled by the method of interstate compact.
Laws which protect wasteful practices are certainly not conducive to maximum
development. The policy of the law in the arid states is to compel an economical
use of water; a prior appropriator should not be able to block future beneficial uses
by insisting on receiving more water than is absolutely necessary for his purpose.
The courts have not, however, firmly adhered to this policy in all cases; in some,
they have given it little more than lip service 2 Early irrigation decrees were often
[or atrociously large quantities of water, and many of these are still in effect. They
do not prevent today's courts and water officials from restricting the use under
them in accordance with modern standards.2 9 Similarly, transmission losses might
be given a modern treatment. If an appropriator's ditch is very long or the soil
through which it is dug is every porous, a considerable amount of water will be
" Rank v. (Krug) United States, 142 F. Supp. i (S.D. Cal. 1956).
"
5 Willey v. Decker, ii Wyo. 496, 73 Pac. 210 (903); Lindsey v. McClure, 136 F.2d 65 (ioth Cir.
7943).
"O COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§47-1-I, 147-1-3 (1953).
"'E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §73-2-8 (953); WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §71-265 (945).
'" Compare State v. Birdwood Irri. Dist., 154 Neb. 52, 46 N.W.2d 884 (i95i), with Joerger v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co., 207 Cal. 8, 276 Pac. 1017 (1929).
"See Quinn v. John Whitaker Ranch Co., 54 Wyo. 367, 92 P.2d 568 (939); Tudor v. Jaca, 178
Ore. 126, 165 P.2d 770 (1946).
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lost by evaporation and seepage between the point where it is diverted from the
stream and the place of use. In some states, an allowance is made for a reasonable
amount of such losses in transmission; 30 in others, the amount needed at the place
of use is measured out to the appropriator at the point of diversion.3 ' In early times,
the latter rule would have been unrealistic, but today it may have salutary effects,
since appropriators will be encouraged to line their ditches and otherwise improve
their facilities, so that water will be more economically used and more land can
be brought under irrigation. States where water is especially precious might well
give some thought to this problem.
A related problem arises from stream transmission losses. In the settlement of
the West, the lands first taken up were frequently located on the lower reaches of
streams that lost much of their water into the ground as they flowed over gravelly
and porous beds. Appropriations made in such locations, thui, may preclude full
use of the water that is available upstream, for the lower appropriator's priority will
be protected if any usable quantity will reach his point of diversion, even though this
means that the junior is forced to let a much larger quantity flow past his head-
gate.32 This rule has been criticized as unduly wasteful of the natural resourceO3
The solution to the problem may be economic, in that if the benefits that would
accrue from upstream use are, in fact, much greater than those realized by the senior
appropriator, it would seem feasible for the upstream user to buy out the lower
prior rights and transfer the use upstream. But legal solutions may be possible in the
form of rotation systems that would more equitably spread the benefits of the water,"4
or physical solutions might be imposed if it can be found that underground sources
fed by upstream irrigation will supply the downstream priorities3
Another important factor in the encouragement of development is the minimiza-
tion of costs. Under a prior appropriation system, if there is unappropriated water
available, the costs of development are encompassed within the framework of the
project itself, the physical works needed to utilize the water. Under a riparian
system, there may be an added cost in procuring a firm supply, even where the
water is not presently being used. A prospective riparian or nonriparian user,
seeking a firm supply, may have to buy his peace from a number of other riparians,
either on the open market or, if a public use is involved, by condemnation. Of
course, if stability in advance is not obtained by grant and water rights are sought
to be purchased after the user finds himself in trouble because he is now infringing
"ONEV. COMP. LAws §7899 (x929); N. D. REv. CODE §61-1403 (1943)-
"Stickney v. Hanrahan, 7 Idaho 424, 63 Pac. 189 (1900); In re North Loup River Public Power
& Irri. Dist., 149 Neb. 823, 32 N.W.2d 869 (948).
"Raymond v. Wimsette, r2 Mont. 551, 21 Pac. 537 (1892); State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb.
163, 292 N.W. 239 (1940).
" Fisher, Western Experience and Eastern Appropriation Proposals, in SYmrvosium oN Tm LAW oF
WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES (to be published by the Conservation Foundation
1957).
- ' See Dameron Valley Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Bleak, 6x Utah 230, 211 Pac. 974 (1922); Albion-
Idaho Land Co. v. Naf Irri. Co., 97 F.2d 439 (roth Cir. 1938).
"See Fisher, supra note 33.
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the reasonable uses of riparians, the value of the water right may be the price of
buying the riparian's forebearance to enjoin the use, a price which may well be what
it is worth to the nonriparian to continue his development0 6
III
SECURITY
A system of water law that would promote and encourage maximum development
must offer to the water user security for his investment in facilities. Security of
water rights has been recently analyzed in a most interesting fashion by an econo-
mist,3 7 who points out that the concept actually involves three quite different things:
(I) legal certainty, the protection against unlawful acts, subject to the "rule un-
certainty" and "fact uncertainty" inevitably involved in legal conflicts; (2) physical
certainty, the protection against variation in the quantity of water available for the
use; and (3) tenure certainty, protection against the loss of the water right by the
exercise of lawful acts by others. In all of these aspects, appropriative rights seem
to offer advantages over riparian rights.
The legal protection given by a system of water law is difficult to measure. In one
respect, the system of water masters or commissioners charged with the duties of dis-
tributing water according to priorities gives greater protection to the western appropri-
ator than does the lawsuit which is the sole resort of the riparian. The appropriator,
in other words, has a policeman on the beatO' The subsidiary factor of rule uncer-
tainty, the inability to predict which of several lines of authority a judge will follow,
seems greater under riparian law. In some jurisdictions, there may be the fear that
the "natural flow" rule will be invoked by a court to stop a development that materi-
ally diminishes the stream, especially if the development is nonriparian 9 In many
states, there is doubt as to the extent of riparian land,40 the permissible scope of irriga-
tion,4 ' and the extent to which storage for power and other operations is permissible.42
There is also the ever-present combination of rule and fact uncertainty involved in
the determination of reasonable use 3 Of course, there are rule uncertainties in
30 See Bingham, California Law of Riparian Rights, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 251 (1934) (practice described
as blackmail).
"\Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System of Water Rights, 32 LAND. ECON. 295
(1956).
'8 See Lasky, supra note 8. This is, perhaps, a feature of administration rather than basic law, a
feature that may not be entirely suitable to eastern development. See Marquis, Remarks, in SYmposium ON
THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES (to be published by the Conservation
Foundation 1957).
' See 4 PicHARD R. B. POWELL, REAL PPROPERTY 359, 372 n. 2 (1956).
'0 See Haar and Gordon, supra note 9; Arens, Michigan Law of Water Allocation, in SYMposium ON
TIE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES (to be published by the Conservation
Foundation 1957).
4 See Ellis, Some Legal Aspects of Water Use in North Carolina, SymFosium ON THE LAW OF WATERt
ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES (to be published by the Conservation Foundation 1957);
Arens, supra note 40.
"
1 See Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 8r, 252 Pac. 607 (1926); Moore
v. California Oregon Power Co., 22 Cal.2d 725, 140 P.2d 798 (1943); Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. Rapid
City Electric Co., 16 S.D. 451, 93 N.W. 650 (1903).
' See Haar and Gordon, supra note 9; Arens, supra note 40; Ellis, supra note 41"
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appropriation law as well, but most of the choice-of-law problems are met by statutes,
and in working out a modern water code, these choices can be made.
The control of physical uncertainty is obviously not entirely in the hands of the
lawmakers; creeks and even rivers dry up during long periods of drought. But
the uncertainty of the supply of water for a particular use is affected by the type of
right held for that use. Physical uncertainty is minimized for early appropriators,
yet magnified for junior appropriators; for, by the principle of priority, the senior re-
ceives the full quantity of his appropriation, shifting the risk of stream variation
to the junior, whose supply may be shut off entirely. Under riparian law, with its
equality of right, water users with the same or equal reasonable uses may all be
granted some water in times of shortage, although there is no assurance that each
will receive enough to make his operation worthwhile. Although equality of right
has a democratic sound and a surface appeal to most people, an equal share of a
supply insufficient for all may be so small as to be insufficient for each. But the risk
of physical uncertainty is not always borne equally by all riparians. What might
be a reasonable use in good water years may become highly unreasonable in times
of drought,44 and some riparians may, thus, lose their right temporarily.
But a true idea of the physical certainty obtainable under appropriation law cannot
be based on a picture of the water commissioner marching up and down the stream,
shutting off the ditches of junior appropriators as the flow drops during the summer
months. Through the coordination of modern engineering science and modern de-
velopments in the law of prior appropriation, a stability can be reached that cannot
be matched under riparian law. The hardship to the junior appropriator resulting
from varying stream flows was first alleviated by developing reservoirs to hold spring
floods for use later in the season. As the streams were found to fluctuate from year
to year, larger reservoirs were built to carry over water from the good years and
provide a supply in times of drought. And often, a good supply can be found in
a neighboring watershed less blessed with agricultural land or industrial opportunities.
Much stored water and much water imported from other basins, accordingly, is today
applied supplementally to lands originally dependent upon junior diversions of
direct stream flow. In these ways, the supply may be firmed up and the variations
minimized. Appropriation principles are more conducive to these water development
projects that alleviate this uncertainty of supply-projects that are usually the heart
of river basin development. Under statutes regulating new appropriations, which
provide for the denial of permits'if there is no unappropriated water in the source
of supply, appropriations may be granted to the limit of the available water, giving
both senior and junior a firm right to a firm supplyYr But even if a firm supply
"Meng v. Coffey, 67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713 (1903).
This seems to be the goal toward which the practice under the law of prior appropriation is
moving. Admittedly, much unstable junior development has occurred in the past; but many of today's
projects are for the purpose of giving a supplemental supply to such insecure water uses. In the ground-
water field, there is much emphasis on restricting the issuance of pumping permits in new areas
to the safe yield of the aquifiers. WVAsH. REv. CODE §90.44.070 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. §537.735
(1955). Cf. Harris, Water Allocations under the Appropriation Doctrine in the Lea County Basin oJ New
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is achieved in a valley governed by riparian law, there is no legal limit to the
riparian's demands, and if too many choose to participate, or if demands increase, the
firm supply may become insufficient to satisfy all rights.
As for certainty of tenure of water rights, the appropriative right seems, again,
to be preferable. It has been defined as a vested right to take and divert from the
source a particular quantity of water annually forever.4 The right is clearly defined
as to priority, quantity, period of use, and point of diversion. The senior appropri-
ator is protected against invasions by later takers, and the junior appropriator is
protected against enlargement of the uses of senior appropriators.
The perpetual nature of an appropriative right is subject to one qualification, stem-
ming from the utilitarian nature of the doctrine-if it is not used, the water right
is lost by operation of the rules of abandonment and forfeiture.4 7
The right is also subject to termination under powers of eminent domain, but
security of investment is not thereby impaired, since compensation for the value of
the use is substituted for the expectations from the continuation of the use. Most
western preference laws, sometimes thought to be threats to the security of appropri-
ations, are, in fact, applications of the eminent domain principle.4 8 It is true that
there are possibilities of destruction of vested appropriative rights by the exercise
of other types of preferences that do not involve compensation, but there are few
instances where legislatures have adopted these, and new preferences of this order may
not constitutionally apply to existing rights.4 Of course, tenure certainty increases
if the particular right stands high in the order of preferences."
Riparian rights are also perpetual, subject to divestment by preferences, such as
a city's exercise of eminent domain for municipal uses. But a particular use of the
right is always subject to future determination of its reasonableness in view of later
needs for the water, and even though the use is reasonable, the right gives no
guarantee of a certain quantity of water as others with equal rights demand a
share.
It may be possible to obtain security under the riparian system through pur-
chases of water rights or of releases from riparians. One difficulty with this ap-
proach, however, is that, to a large extent, the certainty desired by the prospective
water user can rarely be obtained from a single seller. If the prospective user is a
riparian intending to use a large amount of water, he may have to get grants or
releases from a large number of other riparians in order to accumulate enough rights
attached to enough land to insure that future reasonable uses on other lands will
Mexico, in Sum'osum oN THE LAw OF WATER ALLOCATION IN TIM EASTERN UNITED STATES (to be
published by the Conservation Foundation 1957), discussing the restriction of permits to pump from a
nonreplenishable basin in order' to prevent its exhaustion before investments could be amortized.
46 Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). Such a definition, of course, implies no guarantee of
the continuation of the source of supply. See Harris, stupra note 45-
"T See notes 89-91 inIra.
'" See Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 RocKy MT. L. Rzv. 133 (1955).
' Ibid.
0 See Wantrup, supra note 37.
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always leave him a supply. If the developer is a nonriparian, in most states he cannot
buy from one riparian a right to use the water that will be good against other
riparian proprietors. The riparian seller of the "water right" has no right to use
the water on nonriparian land, and he can sell no such right.5 ' Nevertheless, a large
number of so-called transfers of riparian rights have been made to ronriparians. The
reason is that such grants are binding between the parties52 and operate as an
estoppel against the grantor, preventing him and his successors in title from com-
plaining of the nonriparian use.5 3 They may, therefore, enable a nonriparian to buy
out some of the larger riparian proprietors and, hence, serve a legitimate purpose
in insuring him a sufficient supply of water.
A few states give full effect to a grant of riparian rights, even as against other
riparians. The grantee's right is regarded as a derivative one, to be measured by the
extent of the right "of the riparian proprietor,"4 and the grantee obtains a right to
a reasonable use of the stream as if he were substituted for the riparian. But the
right that he obtains is subject to variation in relation to the quantity of the flow
and the reasonable demands of other riparians, and the goal of stability has not
been reached.
Another method of obtaining some security under riparian law is by prescription.
When the old "natural flow" theory was in force, so that any substantial with-
drawal from the stream was a violation of a lower riparian's rights, although it did
him no harm, such rights were easy to obtain, for the simple reason that people
do not often start lawsuits unless they are hurt. 5 However, where the reasonable
use theory is applied, the prescriptive period will not begin to run until actual damage
results from an unreasonable interference with the uses of the riparian.P Therefore,
the continuous use either by an upper riparian or by a nonriparian of a certain
amount of water each year creates no prescriptive rights as against a lower riparian
as long as there is no actual clash between their rights;r and in the ordinary case, no
prescriptive right can be obtained by a water user against riparians situated upstream
from the point of diversion, however long the use continues, for such downstream
use gives the upper riparian no cause for complaint or redress.58 In any event, the
doctrine of prescriptive rights is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem of a
water user who seeks a firm right. The risk involved in investing one's money in a
development, then "sweating out" the prescriptive period in the hope that no action
will be brought is too great.
One aspect of physical insecurity, that has already grown acute in some areas
"Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903); Duckworth v. Watsonville Water
& Light Co., iso Cal. 520, 89 Pac. 338 (1907). See Annot., 14 A.L.R. 330 (19a).
"°Texas Co. v. Burkett, 1i7 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273, 54 A.L.R. 1397 (1927).
"Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 150 Cal. 520, 89 Pac. 338 (907).
" Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P.2d oo2 (1946).
"See Shaw, The Development of the Law of Waters in the West, so CALip. L. REV. 443 (1922).
"Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (949).
"'Pabst v. Finmand, i9o Cal. 124, 211 Pac. s' (1922).
"8 Cory v. Smith, 2o6 Cal. 5o8, 274 Pac. 969 (x929). See Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and
Appropiative Rights to the Use of Water, 33 TEXAs L. REv. 24 (1954), for some exceptions to this rule.
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of the West and is a potential threat in the East deserves special mention. This is
the problem of the loss of substantial quantities of stream flow to those who pump
the underground waters that feed the streams. Most water development in the past
has been accomplished through utilization of the waters of surface streams, but
in recent years, the use of pumped underground water has grown tremendously.
In periods of deficient rainfall, the low water flows of the streams and rivers must
supply the most urgent riparian needs and the earliest priorities; yet, the streamflow
in such periods is derived chiefly from ground-water. 9 It is, therefore, obvious that
there must be some correlation between the laws regulating the use of surface
streams and those regulating the use of water from the contributing ground-water
reservoirs. This is possible in states where the same rule of allocation is applied to
both classes of water, as in those western states which have the rule of prior appro-
priation for both, or as in California where the correlative rights doctrine applied to
underground waters is practically identical to the combination of riparianism and
appropriations for surface streamsP0 But where the allocation rules are different and
ground waters may be withdrawn by the owner of the overlying soil on the basis
either of absolute ownership or of reasonable use in relation to his needs, while stream
waters are allocated on the basis of priority or reasonable use related to the demands of
others, no protection can be given to the stream owner unless the courts seize upon
the legal fiction of an "underground stream."'-
There is danger, moreover, even in states applying the same rule of allocation to
both types of water, that the courts or officials may not recognize the unity of the
fiydrologic cycle and may attempt to treat interrelated sources as separate entities.
It has been suggested, therefore, that statutes further be enacted providing for a cor-
related list of priorities from different bodies of water so interconnected as to consti-
tute, in fact, one common source of supply,62 although this, in itself, would not be
enough. Security of rights to stream waters might, however, be increased by requiring
users of underground waters to cease pumping from wells that interfere with sur-
face flows. But in many situations, the low water flows are merely a surface mani-
festation of an extremely large body of water supporting the stream,63 and to revert
Go See Thomas, Hydrology v. Water Allocation in the Eastern United States, in SYmposium ON THE
LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES (to be published by the Conservation
Foundation 1957). It is reported that in the Platte and Arkansas Valleys of Colorado, three times as
much water must now be sent downstream to supply senior rights as was delivered before irrigation
wells were drilled in the valleys. Denver Post, Nov. 18, 1956, Roundup Section, p. 3, cOl. I.
O Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P.2d 775 (1935); Hinton v. Little, 50 Idaho 371, 296 Pac.
582 (1931); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 54r Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663 (1903).
"1Verdugo Canon Water Co. v. Verdugo, 152 Cal. 655, 93 Pac. io21 (19o8); Maricopa County
Municipal Water Conservation Dist. v. Southwest Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (931). For the
Texas experience, see Pecos County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954), in which well drillers asserting ownership of underground waters were permitted
to destroy, without liability, a stream that had supplied appropriators for ninety years.
0 2 NAT'L RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, STATE WATER LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST 83,
128 (1943).
"In Colorado, examples are the Frenchman Creek area, where pumping soo,ooo acre-feet of water
per year would deplete stream flow by only 15,ooo acre feet, and Beaver Creek, where stopping the pump-
ing of 2o,ooo acre-feet would produce only i,ooo acre-feet of streamflow. See Denver Post, Nov. 18,
1956, Roundup Section p. 9, col. 2.
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to the interest in maximum development, some compromise must be found which
will permit the use of these vast basins of underground water, yet, at the same time,
protect, to the greatest possible extent, the rights of users from surface streams.
A clue to such a compromise may be found in the present appropriation laws.
In no western state can a prior appropriator insist that conditions on the stream
remain the same as they were when he made his appropriation. Though a simple
ditch cut into the bank may have sufficed at first, he cannot skim the cream off the
river and insist that it all flow by to raise the water to the level of his ditch; a
diversion dam must be installed to carry into effect his use and, at the same time,
permit junior uses of the rest of the stream that formerly supported his water up to
the intake. In some states, he must, as development progresses, install, at his own
expense, diversion works consistent with the maximum development of the waters
of the stream, so that he as well as the latecomer bears a share in the cost of total
development 4 In others, he may shift the burden of the cost of improvement to the
junior, 5 or must at least permit a junior appropriator to change his method of
diversion at the junior's expense and install more economical means, if all of his
rights to water are preserved and maintained. 6 Borrowing a page from this surface
water law may solve the instant problem. The supporting subflow may be likened
to the full streamflow that once carried the pioneer's water to his ditch; a change of
means of diversion is now required so that both senior stream appropriator and junior
ground-water appropriator can get their water. This can be done by requiring the
senior to substitute wells for his ditch, without loss of priority, at his own cost or at
the expense of the junior, whichever may seem most desirable.
One last point should be made with reference to tenure certainty. In order to
achieve maximum security, a state water law should provide adequate and efficient
procedures for initiating, adjudicating, and recording water rights. Much emphasis
has been placed, in recent writings, upon the necessity for collecting the basic data
of streamflow and hydrology necessary for adequate planning. One absolutely
essential datum for planning future projects, however, is the amount of present
use of water and the total of existing claims to the water. In most of the western
states, this can readily be ascertained. Early in the history of western appropriation,
it was found that the ordinary lawsuit was an inadequate method of settling water
titles, and statutory procedures were devised for bringing all claimants to the stream
into court. These court procedures are still used in Montana and Colorado, and only
Texas has the lawsuit;67 but in the rest of the states with appropriation laws, admin-
istrative procedures have been substituted, based upon actual stream studies, surveys
"I1n re Owyhee River, 124 Ore. 44, 259 Pac. 292 (1927).
"State ex rel Crowley v. District Court, io8 Mont. 89, 88 P.2d 23, 121 A.L.R. 1031 ('939). Salt
Lake City v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 Pac. 147 (19xi). A strong argument for the proposition that
the senior should bear the cost of the improvement is found in the concurring opinion of Latimer, J. in
Hanson v. Salt Lake City, xz5 Utah 404, 439, 205 P.2d 255, 272 (1949).
" Clausen v. Armington, 123 Mont. 1, 212 P.2d 440 (1949); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v.
Shurtliff, 56 Utah x96, x89 Pac. 587 (1919).
" See Lasky, supra note 8.
MODEL STATE WATER CODE
of land, and inspection of water uses. In Wyoming, Nebraska, and Kansas, the ad-
ministrative agency carries the proceedings through to final adjudication,"' but to
avoid the objection that judicial powers are thus exercised by executive agencies, most
of the states provide for a court decree based upon the administrative findings.6 9 All
of these procedures give actual or published notice to every claimant of an interest in
the stream, requiring him to come in and state his claim, and all end in a final
adjudication effectively barring those who do not appear from making any claim to
the waters, except as a subsequent appropriator.7 ° In those states in which riparian
and appropriative rights exist, the rights of riparians have been adjudicated along
with those of appropriators. 7'
The determination of past rights is not enough, however; the record must also
be kept up-to-date by procedures for initiating water rights or recording them as
they are initiated. The system of permits to appropriate, common in the West, ac-
complishes this effectively, but it must be followed up with procedures for ripening
the permit into a license upon application of the water to beneficial use, otherwise
there is no way of telling which permits have been actually followed by development.
This is not to say that all western appropriative states have adequate procedures.
In some states there are "paper rights" to waters that have never been applied to
beneficial use or that represent uses long since abandoned. Examples are the certified
fillings and permits issued by the Texas Board of Water Engineers, totaling at least
four times the amount of water in actual use, and permits and certificates issued
in Oregon covering twice the acreage actually irrigated.2' Ineffective abandonment
and forfeiture procedures are responsible for this condition. In Wyoming, the courts
have, with understandable reluctance, hesitated to declare that a person has forfeited
his rights, but going beyond simple protection of the appropriator, they have placed
restrictions upon abandonment procedures that make them almost impossible of
enforcement. It is held both that these proceedings can be initiated only by a water
user who can clearly show that he will be directly benefited by the water, a condi-
tion extremely hard to prove on a fluctuating stream, and that the complaint of for-
feiture must be brought within the period of limitations, which begins to run at the
time of the abandonment, although the necessity for litigation would not normally
occur to other appropriators until the use of the water was resumed. In addition, if
the use of the water is resumed before the cancellation proceedings are initiated, the
right is revived.73 Such "stale claims" have created considerable uncertainty both for
existing appropriators and would-be new users needing to know the amount of
water covered by valid rights senior to theirs.O4
1s Ibid.; see also KAN. GEN. STAT. §82a-7o8 (1949).
" See Lasky, supra note 8. 70 Ibid.
71 See Trelease, supra note 58. 7' See Fisher, supra note 33.
7 Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572 (1939); Sturgeon
v. Brooks, 73 VYO 436, 281 P.2d 675 (1955).
7" See Fisher, supra note 33; Note, Stale Claims in Texas Stream Waters, 28 TExAs L. Rav. 93z
6950).
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IV
FLEXIBILITY
On the score of flexibility, prior appropriation has received the criticism and
riparianism the praise. Charges of fixity, of freezing existing patterns of resource use,
and of restricting industrial growth are preferred against the doctrine of appropria-
tion,75 and with some justification. Typically, an appropriation is regarded as a grant
for a particular use forever; and the earliest and most stable water rights are, thus, tied
to the pioneer economy, leaving modern developments to take their place at the foot
of the priority list, with the least assurance of a firm water supply. And in some
states, restrictions on transfers of water rights to new uses or places of use seems fur-
ther to insure this result. Under riparian law, on the other hand, flexibility is achieved
by permitting new riparian users of the water to compete on an equal footing with
the old. The highest economic use of water may receive judicial recognition as the
most reasonable, and at any time, a court may reshuffle the water rights to exclude
old uses as no longer reasonable and to permit new uses. There is, however, no
guarantee that the new uses are more economical or suitable than the old," and the
price of this flexibility is insecurity, for such riparian transfers are made without
compensation.
But flexibility and stability are not necessarily antipodal, and only in some states
are appropriations inflexible. It is possible for appropriative protection of invest-
ment to exist along with freedom of transfer of water rights. If the desired flexibility
is voluntary transferability with compensation, to permit new uses to bid freely for
water on the market in competition with other new or old users, the appropriative
rights of some states are ideally suited for this purpose. Originally, the appropriations
acquired on the public domain of the West were regarded as freely salable, and
this is still the rule in some states 7 In Colorado, for instance, the use of the water
is not limited to the land where the water was first applied, and a water right may
be alienated apart from the land, its use transferred from one place to another, or even
the character of the use changed, so long as such change does not result in the use of
a larger quantity of water than the right calls for7
On the other hand, some states prohibit the change of water used for irrigation
from the lands for which it was originally appropriated, except when, for natural
causes beyond the control of the owner, it becomes impracticable beneficially or eco-
nomically to use the water for the irrigation of the original landyo Such laws
prohibit the transfer of water rights from relatively poor to more fertile lands, re-
'5 Marquis, Freeman, and Heath, supra note 9; NAT'L RESOURCES PLANNING BoARD, op. cit. supra
note 62, at 45.
' See Arens, supra note 40.
"See W. A. HUTCMNS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAWS Op WATER RIGrrs 38-384 (5942).
"
8 Hassler v. Fountain Mutual Irri. Co., 93 Co1. 246, 26 P.2d X02 (1933). The right to make
such a change is subject to the restriction that no damage to the rights of other appropriators may result.
Typically, this prevents changes that would deprive downstream users of the benefits of return flow.
7' See HuTcmNS, 70C. ct. supra note 77.
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quire an appropriator for new lands to take his place at the bottom of the priority
list, and prevent him from purchasing a firm water right, although he is able to do
so. The purpose behind these restrictive statutes seems to have been to prevent
abuses that arose from the transfer of some old water rights. Many early adjudica-
tions gave irrigators far more water than they really needed, so that the appropriator
not infrequently sold his unused water, to which he really had no right.80 To
avoid such abuses and to insure the protection of some interests, such as recreation,
that cannot bid for water on the market, the control of such transfers might be left
in the lands of an agency that would allow all such changes unless it affirmatively
appeared that the public interest would be prejudiced.8 '
Such transfers of appropriative rights offer many advantages over deeds and
releases of riparian rights. The purchaser gets a right to a fixed quantity of water,
tenure certainty, and as firm a right in terms of physical certainty as he is willing to
pay for, depending upon where the right he purchases fits into the priority list. He
does not need to buy riparian land nor move his operation to the river bank.
If the flexibility desired is the power to force involuntary changes from one
use to another, with compensation, again appropriation seems to have the advantage.
As previously noted, most western preference statutes create rights of condemnation
and permit the exercise of the preference only if the prior nonpreferred appropriator
is paid full compensation for the loss of his water. Thus, flexibility is achieved with-
out confiscation of investment, for although the nonpreferred user loses the use of
the water, he does receive its value. Such preferences may insure the economic
growth of certain types of water use deemed desirable when the statutes were enacted,
but admittedly, most of today's preferences embody the economic thinking of yester-
day.82 To the extent that a legislature, perhaps under the guidance of a planning
agency, can foresee that a certain purpose is now and will be tomorrow more desirable
than another use, such preferences are valid, but they should be periodically reviewed
in order to keep abreast of modern thinking8 3
In some situations, flexibility may be thought to demand the transfer of water
from one use to another without the payment of compensation, whatever the cost
in loss of stability of investment. There are a few examples of such true prefer-
ences, by which a new preferred use is placed at the top of the priority list and may
be initiated without regard to the fact that the supply is already fully appropriated
for other purposes8 4 In Texas, since i93i , for example, all appropriations (except
of the Rio Grande) are granted subject to future appropriations for municipal pur-
poses85 Several interstate compacts also declare that the impounding and use of
water for hydroelectric power will be subservient to the use and consumption of
water for agricultural and domestic purposes8 ' And the federal government has
80 See ELwOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 174 (1903)-
81 Cf. NAT'L REsotmucs PLANNING BOARD, op. cit. supra note 62, at 45 (o943)-
m See Trelease, supra note 48. 83 Ibid.
84 Ibid. 8'TEx. REV. Cxv. STAT. art. 7471 (1948).
"Colorado River Compact, 45 STAT. xo64 (1928), 43 U.S.C. §6171 (1952); Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact, 63 STAT. 31 (1949), 43 U.S.C. §6171 note (1952); Snake River Compact, Act of April
21, x95o, 64 STAT. 29 (1950).
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given assurance that the use of western waters to maintain flowing navigation chan-
nels will not'conflict with present or future beneficial consumptive uses.s7
If there is doubt as to the wisdom of granting a perpetual right to a certain use
or type of use, and yet it is thought desirable to avoid absolute loss of stability, one
available device is a permit for a specified limited time, during which the appropri-
ator may recapture his investment through amortization. Examples of this technique
are appropriations for power purposes in South Dakota and Arizona, limited to fifty
and forty years, respectively88
Another type of appropriative flexibility, again without compensation, consists of
abandonment and forfeiture. As old rights fall into disuse, usually because of eco-
nomic unsuitability, they cease to exist. An appropriative right may be lost by
abandonment, which consists of the voluntary relinquishment and nonuse of a water
right, coupled with an intention not to renew the use of the water.89  A number of
states have adopted a different concept, that of forfeiture, and provide that failure to
use water for a certain period of time will result in the loss of the right, regardless of
the intent of the owner,"° although forfeiture statutes are not generally applied when
the nonuse is involuntary and not attributable to the neglect of the appropriator.0 '
V
PROTECTION OF PUBLIC INTERESTS
An ideal system of water use law should give protection to two types of public
interests-the interest in the protection against exploitation and waste of water re-
sources, including the interest in obtaining optimum development and seeing that
water is put to the best possible use, as well as the interest held collectively by mem-
bers of the public in such uses of water as navigation, fishing, and recreation. When
tested by this criterion, neither the substantive law of appropriation nor the substantive
laiv of riparian rights seems to hold any marked advantage over the other. Both
systems have concepts designed to curb the wasteful use of water, although the
riparian ideal of reasonable use is based primarily on the question of how much
damage the use will inflict upon private interests, 2 while the fairly new appropriative
concept of "reasonable beneficial use" does place emphasis upon the public interest
in the economic use of the water. 3 Nevertheless, courts dealing with riparian rights
have looked to the general public interest in full utilization of the waters in some
cases, in which they have held that a riparian must suffer some damage from
another riparian's use in order that full use of scarce supplies can be made.0 4 Riparian
S7This is the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment to the Flood Control Act of 1944, 58 STAr. 887, 33
U.S.C. §70X (1952).
SS.C. CODE §61.O152 (1952); ARIZ. CODE ANN. §75-111 (1939).
s, See HUTCHINS, op. cit. supra note 77, at 389.
Io1d. at 392.
"'Ramsey v. Gottsche, 51 Wyo. 5z6, 6o P.2d 535 (1937).
" See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §852 (1939).
" See NAT'L RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, Op. cit. supra note 62, at 40.
9 Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, ix Cal.2d 5o, 81 P.2d 533 (1938).
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doctrines have also been successful in preserving to the public rights to navigation
and fisheriesY
One technique used to a limited degree in the West, however, may offer possi-
bilities unobtainable under riparian law. To the extent that it is possible to forecast
benefits from a long-range use that will exceed those from more immediate uses,
waters may be reserved from appropriation to save them for the future use. A
potential project may be conceived long before actual need arises, and a large and
comprehensive development may wait years before final plans can be drawn or
financial arrangements made. If such a project constitutes the most desirable and
economic use of a large part of the waters of the source of supply, it may be jeopar-
dized by less desirable appropriations capturing substantial quantities of water before
it can be initiated. In order to protect such potential developments, therefore, the
Utah statutes authorize the governor to suspend the right of the public to appropri-
ate the waters. 0 Where recreational interests in a particular stream are regarded as
paramount, the same technique has been used. In Oregon, many streams that form
beautiful falls or that are famous fishing waters have been reserved from appropria-
tion;9 7 and in Idaho, the governor has been authorized to appropriate the waters of
certain lakes in trust for the people in order to preserve them for their scenic
beauty, health, and recreational values05
The procedures that have been developed to administer appropriation law, as
distinguished from the substantive law, offer many advantages for protecting the
public interest over the typical court enforcement of riparian rights. The courts are
not an adequate agency for insuring the optimum community benefits from water
resources;09 it has been pointed out that the adversary process rivets the court's at-
tention to the particular parcels of land in dispute and is not well designed for
assisting the court to reach the best conclusion regarding social policy and the public
interest. 00 One major defect in riparian administration is that it is ex post facto,
in that lawsuits do not ordinarily arise until both competing uses are in operation.
In contrast, in all but three of the seventeen western states, no use of water can be
initiated except upon application to state water officials for a permit, which may be
denied if there is no unappropriated water. In addition, the administrators may
deny the permit if the proposed use would conflict with the public interest.' 0 The
water administrators of several states have the power to choose among pending ap-
plications that seek to appropriate from the same supply when the available water is
insufficient for all-in some, according to a fixed list of preferences,' in some, on
broad discretionary grounds relating to maximization of benefits from the use of the
water7°  Not only may applications for appropriations be denied as contrary to the
public interest, they may be subordinated to projects promising greater benefits,' 0 4
Or See Arens, supra note 40. "0 UTAH CODE ANN. §73-6-I (953).
07ORE. REV. STAT. §§538.I10-538.300 (1955). "IDAHO CODE ANN. §§67-43o, 67-4304 (1949).
"See Arens, supra note 40. 100 Haar and Gordon, supra note 9.
101 See Lasky, supra note 8. 102 See Trelease, supra note 48.
103 ibid.
'o' Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943).
318 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLMS
or they may be issued subject to conditions or restrictions dictated by public interest."'
It has been noted that this technique has been little used, that very few cases of
denials of permits on public interest grounds have reached the courts.1°0 This seems
to be a very desirable state of affairs, rather than an indication that the procedure is an
ineffective one. Most uses of water that have been made in the past, when regarded
individually, have desirably added to the wealth of the user and of the community.
The use of water t6 unlock the mineral wealth that drew the early pioneers, to make
possible the western agricultural economy, its use for municipal needs, power, and
stockwatering could all be said to fit into the public interest in the development of the
West. State regulation has been a stand-by power; the need for its exercise may
grow as maximum development approaches.
In some of the eastern states with the riparian system, there are provisions re-
quiring permits for the use or for certain uses of water. These, however, seem to
operate on a much more restricted scale than do the western permits. For the most
-part, the permits issued under these laws seem to be certificates to riparians that their
proposed uses are not against the public interest, and the public interest protected
seems to be principally the maintenance of minimum streamflows. Such permits
as have been issued to nonriparians are construed as giving no rights against riparians.
Their administration seems to have had no substantial effect upon riparian rights, nor
have administrators attempted to use them so as to give any effect to priority of
:10Tappropriation. l~
VI
THE PROBLEM OF UNUSED RIPARIAN RIGHTS
In theory, at least, a water law that gives effect to unused riparian rights seems
to violate nearly all of the standards for optimum river basin development. These
rights constitute the main threat to nonriparian and out-of-watershed development,
they are the principal cause of insecurity of existing riparian uses, and their presence
adds greatly to the cost of obtaining firm water rights under a riparian system.
They are unrecorded, their quantity is unknown, their administration in the courts
provides very little opportunity for control in the public interest. To the extent that
they may deter others from using the water for fear of their ultimate exercise, they
are wasteful, in the sense of costing the economy the benefits lost from the deterred
uses. Their main advantage, that of flexibility, can be better obtained by other
methods.
Unused riparian rights may still present problems in the western states of Cali-
fornia, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas,'08 and they present an apparent prob-
105 East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. v. Dep't of Public Works, i Cal.2d 476, 35 P.2d 1027 (1934);
Kirk v. State Board of Irri., go Neb. 627, 134 NAV. 167 (1912).
00 Fisher, supra note 33.
"'See Ellis, supra note 9. Marquis, Freeman, and Heath, supra 9, suggest that these eastern
permits statutes could have a broader significance and could even be used to introduce an clement of
priority.
.0. See Trelease, supra note 58.
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lem in all of the eastern states except Mississippi °0  How serious a problem this is, in
fact, is difficult to determine except on the basis of local study.
Most recent reforms and proposals for water law reforms have centered about
some variation of a plan which would protect all existing riparian uses of water as
"vested rights," but would provide that all future uses of water shall be by virtue of
priority of appropriation, subject to regulation by the state."0 Over this plan, the
controversy rages, often tinged with emotionalism."' Defenders of riparianism cry
out at this destruction of property." 2 And it is admitted that these rights may have
real value, as representing claims to a future water supply; they may even represent
actual investment, if riparian land has been purchased at a price which includes the
potential value of the underdeveloped rights. To destroy such values would run
counter to one of the major principles outlined above-security of investment in water
rights.
But would such rights be "destroyed"? For the most part, there are still excess
... See Ellis, supra note 9. Mississippi has eliminated unused riparian rights and substituted a system
of appropriation. Miss. CODE ANN. §§5956-O to 5956-30 (Supp. 1956).
.1. This proposal is known as the "Oregon plan" and has been in force in that state since i909. ORE.
Rav. STAT. §539.0o (1955). It was adopted by Kansas in 1945, KAN. GEN. STAT. §§82a-701 to 82a-722 (1949); by South Dakota in 1955, S.D. Laws 1955, c. 430, p. 5o6; and by Mississippi in 1956. Supra
note 1o9. The Kansas statute is subject to the possible construction that unused riparian rights nullifiedby appropriations may have to be paid for. In Nebraska, which adopted a statute permitting appropria-
tions in 1889 without stating its effect on riparian rights, it was held that an appropriator might take
the riparian's water as if by condemnation, that a riparian could not enjoin an appropriative use, and thathis damages for loss of unused riparian rights was nominal only. Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb.325, 93 NV.W 781 (1903); McCook Irri. & Water Power Co. v. Crews, 70 Neb. xo9, 96 N.W. 996,102 N.W. 249 (igo5); Cline v. Stock, 71 Neb. 70, 98 N.W. 454 (1904), 7 Neb. 79, 1o2 N.W. 265(x9o5). This limitation of remedies accomplished the same results as the Oregon-plan statutes. Wash-ington, which had a similar duplicity in its laws, reached the same end by holding that waters were freefor appropriation if not beneficially used by the riparian within a reasonable time. Brown v. Chase,
525 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923); In re Sinlahekin Creek, 162 Wash. 635, 299 Pac. 649 (1931). For
a more detailed treatment, see Trelease, supra note 58, at 6o-65.
"" E.g., Mann, Riparian Irrigation Rights as Declared and Enforced by the Courts, and Protected by
the Statues, of Texas, in PROCEEINOS OF THE WATER LAW CONFERENCES, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAs 169
(195A).
... The constitutionality of the plan, as against "due process" objections, has been discussed in suchdetail as to require only a reference to the literature. See Trelease, supra note 58, at 62-67; Marquis,
Freeman, and Heath, supra note 9, at 32-35; Coates, supra note 9, at 286-96; Fisher, Due Process
and the Effect of Eastern Appropriation Proposals on Existing Rights, in SYmPosIum ON THE LAw OF
WATER ALLOCATIoN IN Tm EASTERN UNITED STATES (to be published by the Conservation Foundation
1957). To the cases therein cited should be added a recent decision by a three-judge federal court,
affirmed without opinion by the United States Supreme Court. Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 6x7 (D.Kan.), aft'd, 352 U.S. 863 (1956). In upholding the Kansas statute, supra note ito, in so far as it
related to regulation of ground-water, the court said, at 624-25: "The power of a state either to modify
or reject the doctrine of riparian rights because unsuited to the conditions in the state and to put into
'force the doctrine of prior appropriation and application to beneficial use or of reasonable use has long
been settled by the adjudicated cases.
"Of course, such a modification in the law of the state must recognize valid existing vested rights, but
we do not regard a landowner as having a vested right in underground waters underlying his land which
he has not appropriated and applied to beneficial use.
"We hold that the state could properly apply the doctrine of prior appropriation and application tobeneficial use to unused and unappropriated waters so long as it recognized and afforded protection to
rights which landowners had acquired at the time of the effective date of the Act to appropriate and
use water."
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waters in the states with unused riparian rights. Such a statute would not auto-
matically cut off the riparian from all participation in the stream; although he would
lose the exclusive nature of his privilege, he might still obtain water for his use via
the appropriation method. It is true that there would be a time limit upon the
privilege, which could only be exercised up to the point when by his use he would
deprive another person of the latter's water and investment. If this period were
felt to be too short or too indefinite, the riparian might be given the privilege of be-
coming an appropriator for a specified time'--in effect, giving him a preference
to the use of the water during that period.
On the other hand, it might be found practically or politically expedient to retain
the unused riparian right in some form, yet still obtain advantages from an appropri-
ation system to control nonriparian uses. Studies might prove that in some states or
areas, the amount of riparian land is so small in relation to the amount of water
in the streams that riparian rights might be exercised at will, with the appropriation
law regulating only nonriparian uses." 4 Or it might be found that riparian lands
presented the most desirable sites for future development, justifying such a reserva-
tion in their favor. Or legislative adoption of restrictive interpretations of riparian
rights might free much water for nonriparian appropriation by limiting the quantity
of riparian land, the water the riparian might claim, the uses deemed reasonable, and
by broadening doctrines of prescription and estoppel."' Some measure of certainty,
moreover, might still be introduced by the adoption of appropriation principles and
devices. One such device might be to put such claims on record by an adjudication
procedure-to fix them in quantity so that at least the maximum riparian demands
on the stream might be determined, from which the nonriparians could then calcu-
late the availability of water for their development." 0 And as a final resort, if the
public interest demands both protection of the unused riparian right and freedom of
development from such claims, they could be made subject to condemnationj1 r This
solution has the serious drawback of requiring the developing agency to pay not
only the cost of its project, but also the value of the hypothetical uses the riparian
might make of the water, an added expense that could be substantial enough to
render the project infeasible.
"' The 1956 Mississippi statute does not take effect until April I, 1958. Miss. CoDe ANN. 55956-o4
(Supp. 1956).
" This would approximate the present California law. Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal.2d 351, 40 P.2d
486 (1935); Meridian, Ltd. v. San Francisco, r3 Cal.2d 424, 9o P.2d 537 (1939).
"' See Trelease, supra note 58. In Texas, this has been done administratively. Board of Water
Engineers Reg. 520.2 (1953).
11. See notes 67-7r supra. For the constitutionality of such procedures, see O'Neil v. Northern
Colorado Irri. Co., 242 U.S. 20 (i916); Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 24r U.S. 440 (1916).
11'Private rights of eminent domain could raise other problems. But. c. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S.
36r (z9o5). Public districts and development agencies could, however, exercise such powers to ac-
complish much.
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CONCLUSION
In the introduction to this article, emphasis was placed upon the importance of
state water law as a force affecting river basin development. This premise may be
based upon a fallacious assumption about human behavior, a fallacy into which law-
trained men may easily fall. Perhaps the law does not play so important a part in
governing the affairs of men; perhaps there is a tendency for men to act on the as-
sumption that everything will come out all right in the end-the lawyers will
straighten out the details. A person trained in another discipline, an engineer, has
postulated that, in fact, water laws have a relatively unimportant effect on develop-
ment, that entrepreneurs initiate projects and engineers build them without much
regard for the fears here discussed." 8
Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between. If poorly-designed laws do not im-
pede all developments, how much do they impede? If development proceeds outside
the law, to what extent is present law a trap waiting to be sprung on those who have
invested in projects? How many projects are not built? The biggest builder and
financier of water-use projects, the federal government, has refused to act in the face
of uncertain water tides. A large project in Kansas, for example was delayed until
the validity of that state's law subordinating riparian rights to appropriations was
determined;. 9 the Boulder Canyon Project Act for the construction of Hoover Dam
provided that it would not be operative until certain interstate differences were
settled;'2° and later, the states of the upper Colorado River Basin gladly hurried
into a compact dividing the water among themselves when they were informed that
the final selection of federal reclamation projects would depend upon a firm alloca-
tion of the waters.' 2 1 And in an analogous field, Congress has required that internal
state law must meet a federal standard; the Colorado River Storage Project Act of
1956, in effect, limits irrigation benefits to states whose laws provide for the organiza-
tion of conservancy districts' 22
Whether the threat of federal nonspending is regarded as a carrot or a stick, it
can act as a powerful inducement for a state to review its water laws. Aside from
such consideration, the states should seriously study the need for revision of their
laws. It is easy to be complacent about water law, to adopt a wait-and-see attitude,
to say that there is no present emergency crying for action. But if this attitude is
taken, the state may never know what it has lost through the lack of development.
Nor does the fact that a state has the prior appropriation doctrine as the basis
of its law give it grounds for complacency. A watershed restriction that prevents
... Wolman, Renar.s, in Symosum ON TaE LAw op WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED
STATES (to be published by the Conservation Foundation 1957).
... State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kans. 546, 207 P.2d 440 (1949).
120 45 STAT. 1058 (1928), 43 U.S.C. §617c(a) (952).
"'1 U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, TE CoLosAno RivER 185 (1946).
12270 STAT. 105 (956), 43 U.S.C.A. §§620-620(o) (Supp. 1956).
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bringing water to the place of need is as much of a hindrance to development in
Colorado as in New York. An unused appropriation that can be reinstated at will
is as serious a threat to the security of a new right as is an unused riparian right.
A preference for irrigation surviving from pioneer times or a jealous tying of water to
agricultural land forever can prevent the industrialization of some parts of the West.
Not all western states have adequate procedures for protecting private and public
interests.
It is not necessary that the course of future development be exactly foreseen.
If present impediments to maximum and optimum development can be identified
and removed, if a framework is provided that will protect present uses, aid and
encourage future desirable uses, and supply means for preventing undesirable uses, it
will be enough.
